LEADER 00000cam 2200865 a 4500 |
001 ^a70129139 |
003 ^aOCoLC |
005 ^a20150113113733.0 |
008 150701s2007||||th 000 0 Eng d |
010 ^a2006019685 |
020 ^a0321419316 (alk. paper) |
020 ^a9780321419316 (alk. paper) |
035 ^a(OCoLC)70129139 |
040 ^aDLC^beng^cDLC^dYDXCP^dBAKER^dOCLCQ^dBTCTA^dOKS^dNLGGC^dOCLCG^dCHVBK^dDEBBG^dOCL^dOCLCQ^dDEBSZ^dOCLCQ^dBDX^dMHA^dOCLCO |
099 ^aMK 84 |
100 1 ^aHolt, Charles A.,^d1948- |
245 10 ^aMarkets, games, & strategic behavior /^cCharles A. Holt |
246 3 ^aMarkets, games, and strategic behavior |
260 ^aBoston :^bPearson Addison Wesley,^cc2007 |
300 ^axviii, 462, 79 p. :^bill. ;^c24 cm |
490 1 ^aThe Addison-Wesley series in economics |
504 ^aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 433-450) and index |
505 00 ^a^gPart 1.^tBasic Concepts: Decisions, Game Theory, andMarket Equilibrium --^gChapter 1.^tIntroduction --^g1.1.^tOrigins --^g1.2.^tOverview --^g1.3.^tMethodology --^g1.4.^tBrief History of Experimental Economics --^gChapter 2.^tPit Market --^g2.1.^tSimple Example --^g2.2.^tClassroom Experiment --^g2.3.^tChamberlin^'s Results andVernon Smith^'s Reaction --^g2.4.^tExtensions --^gChapter3.^tSome Simple Games: Competition, Coordination, andGuessing --^g3.1.^tGame Theory and the Prisoner^'s Dilemma--^g3.2.^tPrisoner^'s Dilemma Experiment --^g3.3.^tCoordination Game --^g3.4.^tGuessing Game --^g3.5.^tExtensions --^gChapter 4.^tRisk and Decision Making --^g4.1.^tWho Wants to Be a Millionaire? --^g4.2.^tSimpleLottery-Choice Experiment --^g4.3.^tPayoff Scale, Order,and Demographics Effects --^g4.4.^tExtensions --^gChapter5.^tRandomized Strategies --^g5.1.^tSymmetric MatchingPennies Games --^g5.2.^tBattle of the Sexes --^g5.3.^tExtensions --^gPart 2.^tMarket Experiments --^gChapter6.^tMonopoly and Cournot Markets --^g6.1.^tMonopoly --^g6.2.^tCournot Duopoly --^g6.3.^tCournot Oligopoly --^g6.4.^tExtensions --^gAppendix.^tOptional Quick CalculusReview --^gChapter 7.^tVertical Market Relationships --^g7.1.^tDouble Marginalization --^g7.2.^tNewsvendorProblem --^g7.3.^tBullwhip Effect --^g7.4.^tExtensions --^gChapter 8.^tMarket Institutions and Power --^g8.1.^tIntroduction --^g8.2.^tExercise of Seller Market Powerwithout Explicit Collusion --^g8.3.^tEdgeworth Cycles andRandom Prices --^g8.4.^tEffects of Market Power --^g8.5.^tExtensions --^gAppendix.^tCalculation of a Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium in Prices --^gChapter 9.^tCollusionand Price Competition --^g9.1.^tCollusion in Posted-OfferMarkets: ^"This Is Economics^" --^g9.2.^tCollusion withSecret Discounts --^g9.3.^tExtensions: Cheap Talk, MutualForbearance, and the ^"V Word^" --^gChapter 10.^tMarketFailure Due to Unraveling: Lemons and Matching Markets --^g10.1.^tEndogenous Product Quality --^g10.2.^tClearinghouse Mechanisms and Unraveling in Labor Markets--^g10.3.^tExtensions: Baseball, Dorm Rooms, School Choice,Deep Space, Sorority Rush,...but Marriage? --^gChapter 11.^tAsset Markets and Price Bubbles --^g11.1.^tBubbles andCrashes --^g11.2.^tDigression on Present Value --^g11.3.^tLimit Order Market Experiment --^g11.4.^tOther Researchon the Call Market Institution --^gPart 3.^tBargaining andBehavioral Labor Economics --^gChapter 12.^tUltimatumBargaining --^g12.1.^tStrategic Advantage and Ultimatums --^g12.2.^tBargaining in the Bush --^g12.3.^tBargaining inthe Lab --^g12.4.^tMulti-Stage Bargaining --^g12.5.^tExtensions: ^"I Will Be Spending Years Trying to FigureOut What This All Meant^" --^gChapter 13.^tTrust,Reciprocity, and Principal-Agent Games --^g13.1.^tTrustGame --^g13.2.^tLabor Market Reciprocity Game --^g13.4.^tExtensions: Field Experiments --^gPart 4.^tPublic Choice--^gChapter 14.^tVoluntary Contributions --^g14.1.^tSocialNorms and Public Goods --^g14.2.^t^"Economists Free-Ride,Does Anyone Else?^" --^g14.3.^tSingle-Round Experiments --^g14.4.^tMulti-Round Experiments --^g14.5.^tExtensions --^gChapter 15.^tVolunteer^'s Dilemma --^g15.1.^tSometimes ItOnly Takes One Hero --^g15.2.^tInitial ExperimentalEvidence --^g15.3.^tMixed-Strategy Equilibrium --^g15.4.^tExperiment on Group Size Effects --^g15.5.^tExtensions --^gChapter 16.^tExternalities, Congestion, and Common PoolResources --^g16.1.^tWater --^g16.2.^tDucks and Traffic --^g16.3.^tFish --^g16.4.^tExtensions --^gChapter 17.^tRentSeeking --^g17.1.^tGovernment with ^"a Smokestack on ItsBack^" --^g17.2.^tRent Seeking in the Classroom Laboratory--^g17.3.^tNash Equilibrium --^g17.4.^tComparative Staticsfor Changes in Cost and the Number of Competitors --^g17.5.^tExtensions --^gChapter 18.^tVoting and PoliticsExperiments --^g18.1.^tMedian Voter Theorem --^g18.2.^tExperimental Tests of Spatial Voting Models --^g18.3.^tFairness and Deviations from Core Outcomes --^g18.4.^tLegislative Bargaining --^g18.5.^tAgendas and StrategicVoting --^g18.6.^tPolls, Runoffs, and Other CoordinatingDevices --^g18.7.^tParticipation Games --^g18.8.^tFieldExperiments --^g18.9.^tExtensions --^gPart 5.^tAuctions --^gChapter 19.^tPrivate Value Auctions --^g19.1.^tIntroduction --^g19.2.^tAuctions: Up, Down, and the^"Little Magical Elf^" --^g19.3.^tBidding against a UniformDistribution --^g19.4.^tBidding Behavior in a Two-Person,First-Price Auction --^g19.5.^tExtensions --^gAppendix.^tRisk Aversion --^gChapter 20.^tTakeover Game --^g20.1.^tWall Street (the Film) --^g20.2.^tTakeover GameExperiment --^g20.3.^tQuality Unraveling --^g20.4.^tExtensions: The Loser^'s Curse --^gChapter 21.^tCommon-Value Auctions and the Winner^'s Curse --^g21.1.^t^"I Wonthe Auction but I Wish I Hadn^'t^" --^g21.2.^tNashEquilibrium --^g21.3.^tWinner^'s Curse --^g21.4.^tExtensions --^gChapter 22.^tMulti-Unit and CombinatorialAuctions --^g22.1.^tDry 2K --^g22.2.^tFCC BandwidthAuctions and Package Bidding Alternatives --^g22.3.^tExperimental Tests of Package Bidding Alternatives --^g22.4.^tExtensions --^gPart 6.^tBehavioral Game Theory:Treasures and Intuitive Contradictions --^gChapter 23.^tMulti-Stage Games --^g23.1.^tExtensive Forms andStrategies --^g23.2.^tTwo-Stage Trust Games --^g23.3.^tCentipede Game --^g23.4.^tExtensions --^gChapter 24.^tGeneralized Matching Pennies --^g24.1.^tCase of BalancedPayoffs --^g24.2.^tNoisy Best Responses --^g24.3.^tEffectsof Payoff Imbalances --^g24.4.^tProbabilistic Choice --^g24.5.^tExtensions --^gChapter 25.^tTraveler^'s Dilemma --^g25.1.^tVacation with an Unhappy Ending? --^g25.2.^tData--^g25.3.^tLearning and Experience --^g25.4.^tIteratedRationality and Quantal Response Equilibrium --^g25.5.^tExtensions --^gAppendix.^tBounded Rationality in theTraveler^'s Dilemma-A Spreadsheet-Based Analysis --^gChapter 26.^tCoordination Games --^g26.1.^t^"The MinimumEffort Game? That^'s One I Can Play!^" --^g26.2.^tNashEquilibria, Numbers Effects, and Experimental Evidence --^g26.3.^tEffort-Cost Effects --^g26.4.^tEquilibrium withNoisy Behavior --^g26.5.^tExtensions --^gAppendix.^tAnalysis of Noisy Behavior in the Coordination Game --^gPart 7.^tIndividual Decision Experiments --^gChapter 27.^tProbability Matching --^g27.1.^tBeing Treated Like a Rat--^g27.2.^tAre Rats Really More Rational Than Humans? --^g27.3.^tSiegel and Goldstein^'s Experiments --^g27.4.^tSimple Model of Belief Learning --^g27.5.^tReinforcementLearning --^g27.6.^tExtensions --^gChapter 28.^tLotteryChoice Anomalies --^g28.1.^tIntroduction --^g28.2.^tAllaisParadox --^g28.3.^tProspect Theory: ProbabilityMisperception --^g28.4.^tProspect Theory: Gains, Losses,and ^"Reflection Effects^" --^g28.5.^tExtensions --^gChapter29.^tISO (in Search of...) --^g29.1.^tIntroduction --^g29.2.^tSearch from a Uniform Distribution --^g29.3.^tExperimental Data --^g29.4.^tOptimal Search --^g29.5.^tExtensions --^gPart 8.^tInformation, Learning, andSignaling --^gChapter 30.^tBayes^' Rule --^g30.1.^tIntroduction --^g30.2.^tSimple Example and a CountingHeuristic --^g30.3.^tRelating the Counting Heuristic toBayes^' Rule --^g30.4.^tExperimental Results --^g30.5.^tBayes^' Rule with Elicited Probabilities --^g30.6.^tFollow-Up Experiment with a Rare Event --^g30.7.^tExtensions --^gAppendix.^tTruthful Elicitation --^gChapter 31.^tInformation Cascades --^g31.1.^t^"To DoExactly as Your Neighbors Do Is the Only Sensible Rule^" --^g31.2.^tModel of Rational Learning from Others^' Decisions--^g31.3.^tExperimental Evidence --^g31.4.^tExtensions --^gChapter 32.^tStatistical Discrimination --^g32.1.^t^"Brown-Eyed People Are More Civilized^" --^g32.2.^tBeingPurple or Green --^g32.3.^tData on StatisticalDiscrimination --^g32.4.^t^"Are Emily and Greg MoreEmployable than Lakisha and Jamal?^" --^g32.5.^tExtensions--^gAppendix.^tDerivation of the DiscriminatoryEquilibrium --^gChapter 33.^tSignaling Games --^g33.1.^tReal Men Don^'t Eat Quiche --^g33.2.^tSeparatingEquilibria --^g33.3.^tPooling |
520 1 ^a^"Markets, Games, & Strategic Behavior combines abehavioral approach with active classroom learningexercises to stimulate student understanding of economicdecisions and interactions in games and markets. Eachchapter begins with a lead-off experiment designed tointroduce students to economic concepts such as theWinner^'s Curse, Asset Market Bubbles, Rent Seeking,Signaling, Information Cascades, Fairness, andReciprocity. Experiments are easy to incorporate into theclassroom, and may be run ^"by hand^" with the instructionsprovided or online with the Veconlab software.^" ^"WithMarkets, Games, & Strategic Behavior, you can: Get Off tothe Right Start. The early chapters cover the basics, andreinforce the concepts with experiments that featuremarkets with many buyers and sellers, simple two-persongames, and risky individual decisions. Choose by Chapter.Short self-contained chapters allow you to choose theorder in which you cover topics like bargaining, auctions,games, and asymmetric information. Make it Accessible.Mathematical arguments are simple since experiments aretypically based on specific cases that distinguishalternate theories. Find the Fit for Your Course. Thebook^'s scope and flexible format make it easy to integrateinto a variety of undergraduate courses includingintermediate microeconomics, game theory, and publiceconomics. Book jacket.^"--BOOK JACKET |
650 0 ^aEconomics^xStudy and teaching (Graduate)^xSimulationmethods |
650 0 ^aMarkets |
650 0 ^aGame theory |
650 0 ^aNegotiation in business |
650 0 ^aEconomics^xPsychological aspects |
776 08 ^iOnline version:^aHolt, Charles A., 1948-^tMarkets, games,& strategic behavior.^dBoston : Pearson Addison Wesley,c2007^w(OCoLC)747305577 |
830 0 ^aAddison-Wesley series in economics |
856 41 ^a^3Table of contents^uhttp://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0615/2006019685.html |
856 41 ^a^3Table of contents^uhttp://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&doc_number=015462957&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
856 41 ^a^3Table of contents^uhttp://digitool.hbz-nrw.de:1801/webclient/DeliveryManager?pid=2102912&custom%5Fatt%5F2=simple%5Fviewer |
999 ^aไชยวัฒน์ วงค์สุวรรณ์ |