|
|
 พบจำนวน 1 รายการ ค้นหา ชื่อผู้แต่ง Holt, Charles A., 1948- |
|
|
|
แสดงผลการสืบค้นที่พบ 1 รายการ |
|
| ผู้แต่ง |
Holt, Charles A., 1948- | | ชื่อเรื่อง |
Markets, games, & strategic behavior / Charles A. Holt | | ชื่อเรื่องที่แตกต่าง |
Markets, games, and strategic behavior | | ISBN |
0321419316(alk.paper) | | ISBN |
9780321419316(alk.paper) | | พิมพ์ลักษณ์ |
Boston : Pearson Addison Wesley, c2007 | | เลขเรียก |
MK 84 | | ลักษณะทางกายภาพ |
xviii, 462, 79 p. : ill. ; 24 cm | | หมายเหตุ |
Contents: Part 1. Basic Concepts: Decisions, Game Theory, andMarket Equilibrium
-- Chapter 1. Introduction
-- 1.1. Origins
-- 1.2. Overview
-- 1.3. Methodology
-- 1.4. Brief History of Experimental Economics
-- Chapter 2. Pit Market
-- 2.1. Simple Example
-- 2.2. Classroom Experiment
-- 2.3. Chamberlin^'s Results andVernon Smith^'s Reaction
-- 2.4. Extensions -- Chapter3. Some Simple Games: Competition, Coordination, andGuessing -- 3.1. Game Theory and the Prisoner^'s Dilemma-- 3.2. Prisoner^'s Dilemma Experiment -- 3.3. Coordination Game -- 3.4. Guessing Game -- 3.5. Extensions -- Chapter 4. Risk and Decision Making -- 4.1. Who Wants to Be a Millionaire? -- 4.2. SimpleLottery-Choice Experiment -- 4.3. Payoff Scale, Order,and Demographics Effects -- 4.4. Extensions -- Chapter5. Randomized Strategies -- 5.1. Symmetric MatchingPennies Games -- 5.2. Battle of the Sexes -- 5.3. Extensions -- Part 2. Market Experiments -- Chapter6. Monopoly and Cournot Markets -- 6.1. Monopoly -- 6.2. Cournot Duopoly -- 6.3. Cournot Oligopoly -- 6.4. Extensions -- Appendix. Optional Quick CalculusReview -- Chapter 7. Vertical Market Relationships -- 7.1. Double Marginalization -- 7.2. NewsvendorProblem -- 7.3. Bullwhip Effect -- 7.4. Extensions -- Chapter 8. Market Institutions and Power -- 8.1. Introduction -- 8.2. Exercise of Seller Market Powerwithout Explicit Collusion -- 8.3. Edgeworth Cycles andRandom Prices -- 8.4. Effects of Market Power -- 8.5. Extensions -- Appendix. Calculation of a Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium in Prices -- Chapter 9. Collusionand Price Competition -- 9.1. Collusion in Posted-OfferMarkets: ^"This Is Economics^" -- 9.2. Collusion withSecret Discounts -- 9.3. Extensions: Cheap Talk, MutualForbearance, and the ^"V Word^" -- Chapter 10. MarketFailure Due to Unraveling: Lemons and Matching Markets -- 10.1. Endogenous Product Quality -- 10.2. Clearinghouse Mechanisms and Unraveling in Labor Markets-- 10.3. Extensions: Baseball, Dorm Rooms, School Choice,Deep Space, Sorority Rush,...but Marriage? -- Chapter 11. Asset Markets and Price Bubbles -- 11.1. Bubbles andCrashes -- 11.2. Digression on Present Value -- 11.3. Limit Order Market Experiment -- 11.4. Other Researchon the Call Market Institution -- Part 3. Bargaining andBehavioral Labor Economics -- Chapter 12. UltimatumBargaining -- 12.1. Strategic Advantage and Ultimatums -- 12.2. Bargaining in the Bush -- 12.3. Bargaining inthe Lab -- 12.4. Multi-Stage Bargaining -- 12.5. Extensions: ^"I Will Be Spending Years Trying to FigureOut What This All Meant^" -- Chapter 13. Trust,Reciprocity, and Principal-Agent Games -- 13.1. TrustGame -- 13.2. Labor Market Reciprocity Game -- 13.4. Extensions: Field Experiments -- Part 4. Public Choice-- Chapter 14. Voluntary Contributions -- 14.1. SocialNorms and Public Goods -- 14.2. ^"Economists Free-Ride,Does Anyone Else?^" -- 14.3. Single-Round Experiments -- 14.4. Multi-Round Experiments -- 14.5. Extensions -- Chapter 15. Volunteer^'s Dilemma -- 15.1. Sometimes ItOnly Takes One Hero -- 15.2. Initial ExperimentalEvidence -- 15.3. Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium -- 15.4. Experiment on Group Size Effects -- 15.5. Extensions -- Chapter 16. Externalities, Congestion, and Common PoolResources -- 16.1. Water -- 16.2. Ducks and Traffic -- 16.3. Fish -- 16.4. Extensions -- Chapter 17. RentSeeking -- 17.1. Government with ^"a Smokestack on ItsBack^" -- 17.2. Rent Seeking in the Classroom Laboratory-- 17.3. Nash Equilibrium -- 17.4. Comparative Staticsfor Changes in Cost and the Number of Competitors -- 17.5. Extensions -- Chapter 18. Voting and PoliticsExperiments -- 18.1. Median Voter Theorem -- 18.2. Experimental Tests of Spatial Voting Models -- 18.3. Fairness and Deviations from Core Outcomes -- 18.4. Legislative Bargaining -- 18.5. Agendas and StrategicVoting -- 18.6. Polls, Runoffs, and Other CoordinatingDevices -- 18.7. Participation Games -- 18.8. FieldExperiments -- 18.9. Extensions -- Part 5. Auctions -- Chapter 19. Private Value Auctions -- 19.1. Introduction -- 19.2. Auctions: Up, Down, and the^"Little Magical Elf^" -- 19.3. Bidding against a UniformDistribution -- 19.4. Bidding Behavior in a Two-Person,First-Price Auction -- 19.5. Extensions -- Appendix. Risk Aversion -- Chapter 20. Takeover Game -- 20.1. Wall Street (the Film) -- 20.2. Takeover GameExperiment -- 20.3. Quality Unraveling -- 20.4. Extensions: The Loser^'s Curse -- Chapter 21. Common-Value Auctions and the Winner^'s Curse -- 21.1. ^"I Wonthe Auction but I Wish I Hadn^'t^" -- 21.2. NashEquilibrium -- 21.3. Winner^'s Curse -- 21.4. Extensions -- Chapter 22. Multi-Unit and CombinatorialAuctions -- 22.1. Dry 2K -- 22.2. FCC BandwidthAuctions and Package Bidding Alternatives -- 22.3. Experimental Tests of Package Bidding Alternatives -- 22.4. Extensions -- Part 6. Behavioral Game Theory:Treasures and Intuitive Contradictions -- Chapter 23. Multi-Stage Games -- 23.1. Extensive Forms andStrategies -- 23.2. Two-Stage Trust Games -- 23.3. Centipede Game -- 23.4. Extensions -- Chapter 24. Generalized Matching Pennies -- 24.1. Case of BalancedPayoffs -- 24.2. Noisy Best Responses -- 24.3. Effectsof Payoff Imbalances -- 24.4. Probabilistic Choice -- 24.5. Extensions -- Chapter 25. Traveler^'s Dilemma -- 25.1. Vacation with an Unhappy Ending? -- 25.2. Data-- 25.3. Learning and Experience -- 25.4. IteratedRationality and Quantal Response Equilibrium -- 25.5. Extensions -- Appendix. Bounded Rationality in theTraveler^'s Dilemma-A Spreadsheet-Based Analysis -- Chapter 26. Coordination Games -- 26.1. ^"The MinimumEffort Game? That^'s One I Can Play!^" -- 26.2. NashEquilibria, Numbers Effects, and Experimental Evidence -- 26.3. Effort-Cost Effects -- 26.4. Equilibrium withNoisy Behavior -- 26.5. Extensions -- Appendix. Analysis of Noisy Behavior in the Coordination Game -- Part 7. Individual Decision Experiments -- Chapter 27. Probability Matching -- 27.1. Being Treated Like a Rat-- 27.2. Are Rats Really More Rational Than Humans? -- 27.3. Siegel and Goldstein^'s Experiments -- 27.4. Simple Model of Belief Learning -- 27.5. ReinforcementLearning -- 27.6. Extensions -- Chapter 28. LotteryChoice Anomalies -- 28.1. Introduction -- 28.2. AllaisParadox -- 28.3. Prospect Theory: ProbabilityMisperception -- 28.4. Prospect Theory: Gains, Losses,and ^"Reflection Effects^" -- 28.5. Extensions -- Chapter29. ISO (in Search of...) -- 29.1. Introduction -- 29.2. Search from a Uniform Distribution -- 29.3. Experimental Data -- 29.4. Optimal Search -- 29.5. Extensions -- Part 8. Information, Learning, andSignaling -- Chapter 30. Bayes^' Rule -- 30.1. Introduction -- 30.2. Simple Example and a CountingHeuristic -- 30.3. Relating the Counting Heuristic toBayes^' Rule -- 30.4. Experimental Results -- 30.5. Bayes^' Rule with Elicited Probabilities -- 30.6. Follow-Up Experiment with a Rare Event -- 30.7. Extensions -- Appendix. Truthful Elicitation -- Chapter 31. Information Cascades -- 31.1. ^"To DoExactly as Your Neighbors Do Is the Only Sensible Rule^" -- 31.2. Model of Rational Learning from Others^' Decisions-- 31.3. Experimental Evidence -- 31.4. Extensions -- Chapter 32. Statistical Discrimination -- 32.1. ^"Brown-Eyed People Are More Civilized^" -- 32.2. BeingPurple or Green -- 32.3. Data on StatisticalDiscrimination -- 32.4. ^"Are Emily and Greg MoreEmployable than Lakisha and Jamal?^" -- 32.5. Extensions-- Appendix. Derivation of the DiscriminatoryEquilibrium -- Chapter 33. Signaling Games -- 33.1. Real Men Don^'t Eat Quiche -- 33.2. SeparatingEquilibria -- 33.3. Pooling | | หมายเหตุ |
Review: ^"Markets, Games, & Strategic Behavior combines abehavioral approach with active classroom learningexercises to stimulate student understanding of economicdecisions and interactions in games and markets. Eachchapter begins with a lead-off experiment designed tointroduce students to economic concepts such as theWinner^'s Curse, Asset Market Bubbles, Rent Seeking,Signaling, Information Cascades, Fairness, andReciprocity. Experiments are easy to incorporate into theclassroom, and may be run ^"by hand^" with the instructionsprovided or online with the Veconlab software.^" ^"WithMarkets, Games, & Strategic Behavior, you can: Get Off tothe Right Start. The early chapters cover the basics, andreinforce the concepts with experiments that featuremarkets with many buyers and sellers, simple two-persongames, and risky individual decisions. Choose by Chapter.Short self-contained chapters allow you to choose theorder in which you cover topics like bargaining, auctions,games, and asymmetric information. Make it Accessible.Mathematical arguments are simple since experiments aretypically based on specific cases that distinguishalternate theories. Find the Fit for Your Course. Thebook^'s scope and flexible format make it easy to integrateinto a variety of undergraduate courses includingintermediate microeconomics, game theory, and publiceconomics. Book jacket.^"--BOOK JACKET | | หัวเรื่อง |
Economics--Study and teaching (Graduate)--Simulationmethods | | หัวเรื่อง |
Markets | | หัวเรื่อง |
Game theory | | หัวเรื่อง |
Negotiation in business | | หัวเรื่อง |
Economics--Psychological aspects |
|
| คุณยังไม่ได้ล็อกอิน คุณสามารถมีกิจกรรมร่วมกับเว็บไซต์ได้ แต่ต้องล็อกอินก่อน :: |
|
| ลำดับที่ |
ประเภท |
เลขเรียก |
สถานที่ |
สถานะ |
| 1. |
หนังสือ | MK 84 2007
| การตลาด | On Shelf
 ขอยืม |
| 2. |
หนังสือ | MK 84 2007 C.2
| การตลาด | On Shelf
ขอยืม | | [แสดง 1/1 รายการ] |
|
|
|
MBS Library Management - v5.7
สืบค้นข้อมูล
Copyright 2024. All Rights Reserved.
